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"The People" and "The People":
Disaggregating Citizen Lawmaking from
Popular Constitutionalism
Raphael Rajendrat
"Before being entombed in a glass case, constitutional history
lived among people, in action."1

Introduction
Affirmative action is under attack. Across the country, and
state by state, activist groups have proposed ballot initiatives
seeking to amend state constitutions to bar race consciousness in2
school admissions policies, municipal contracting, and elsewhere.
After a Michigan-based group funded by Ward Connerly, the
executive director of the anti-Affirmative action umbrella group
3
American Civil Rights Institute, successfully dismantled the
policy in Michigan in 2006, Connerly announced he would
spearhead similar attempts in Arizona, Colorado, Missouri and
4
Nebraska.
t. J.D., cum laude, 2007, New York University School of Law. B.A., History,
2003, Columbia University. The author is a law clerk to the Honorable Janet Bond
Arterton of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. He
thanks Professor Cristina Rodriguez and Adam Blumenkrantz for helpful
comments on an earlier draft, and Professors Helen Hershkoff and Barry Friedman
for their encouragement of his writing.
1. Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Constitution in the Glass Case and Constitutions
in Action, 16 LAW & HIST. REV. 397, 401 (1998).
2. See Tamar Lewin, Michigan Rejects Affirmative Action, and Backers Sue,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2006, at P16.
3. See American Civil Rights Institute, http://www.acri.org (last visited Oct.
29, 2008).
4. See Timothy Egan, Little Asia On the Hill, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2007, at Ed.
Life Supp. 24; Lewin, supra note 2. In November 2008, American Civil Rights
Institute-backed anti-affirmative action measures were on the ballots in Nebraska
(Initiative 424) and Colorado (Amendment 46). Voters in Colorado narrowly
rejected Amendment 46 by a 50.8-49.2 percent margin, but those in Nebraska
approved Initiative 424 by a 58-42 percent margin. See Dan Frosch, Vote Results
Are Mixed on a Ban on Preference, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2008, at A19; Colorado
Secretary of State, Canvass Results (Cumulative),
http://coreports.ezvotetally.com/CanvassReportCumulative/tabid/59Default.aspx
(last visited Jan. 6, 2009) (listing 1,138,083 voters, or 50.8 percent, as voting
against Amendment 46 and 1,102,090 voters, or 49.2 percent, voting for it);
Results,
Election
Unofficial
2008
State,
of
Secretary
Nebraska
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This Article bypasses the debate over the merits of
affirmative action as well as questions about the policy's
constitutionality under the Equal Protection Clause. 5 Instead, it
examines the relationship between popular constitutionalism and
ballot initiatives like the anti-affirmative action Michigan Civil
Rights Initiative (MCRI). This Article does this not to avoid the
merits of the debate, 6 but to contextualize it so as to free that
debate from the risk of confusing the MCRI with other exaltations
of "popular will."
At the risk of stripping an historical observation of its
historical context, 7 this Article suggests that Dan Hulsebosch's
description of constitutionalism in the British imperial and
American colonial eras provides a useful analytic leitmotif with
which to understand and define popular constitutionalism today.
It argues that dominant theories of popular constitutionalism can
be understood-and the borders they share with the wider corpus
of studies on constitutional change can be demarcated-by
reference to the "glass case"f"among people" distinction that Dan
Hulsebosch draws in the epigram above.8 This Article does not
http://www.sos.ne.gov/elec/2008/ElectNight/general.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2008)
(listing 389,372 voters, or 58 percent, as voting for Initiative 424 and 287,233
voters, or 42 percent, voting against it).
5. Several scholars have provided particularly illuminating discussions of the
development of a social agenda that equates (or conflates) affirmative action
programs intended to help subordinated racial groups with racial subordination
itself. See Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification
Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470 (2004)
[hereinafter Siegel, Equality Talk]; Reva B. Siegel & Jack M. Balkin, The American
Civil Rights Tradition:Anticlassification or Antisubordination?,58 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 9 (2003); see also Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy's Barrierto
Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1978) (arguing that on issues such as
affirmative action, lawmaking by initiative will always harm racial minorities);
Kevin R. Johnson, A Handicapped,Not "Sleeping," Giant: The DevastatingImpact
of the Initiative Process on Latina/o and Immigrant Communities, 96 CAL. L. REV.
1259 (2008) (making an argument similar to Derrick Bell's, with respect to Latinao
and immigrant populations, and making specific reference to the anti-affirmativeaction California Civil Rights Initiative whose passage was organized by Ward
Connerly).
6. Indeed, I agree that "[t]he legal profession should be ashamed that the
short 30-year history of affirmative action programs . . . has created more uproar
within the legal community than the 300 years of racial animus and discrimination
before it." Adam Blumenkrantz, et al., Affirming Michigan'sAction: The Michigan
Journal of Race & Law's Response to Dr. Carcieri's'tGrutter v. Bollinger and Civil
Disobedience,"31 U. DAYTON L. REV. 381, 385 (2006).
7. On 'law office history," see John Phillip Reid, Law and History, 27 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 193, 197-204 (1993), which explains that lawyers often cherry-pick
and decontextualize historical facts to support preexisting arguments rather than
drawing lessons and arguments from a full picture of the historical record.
8. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. Indeed, Kramer also uses this
historical distinction. See infra notes 29-34 and accompanying text. It is in large
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revisit the history or historiography that gave rise to this
distinction. Rather, it employs the distinction only as shorthand
to categorize forms of constitutional change into two models. 9
popular
between
distinguishes
analysis
This
of
notion
constitutionalism and a ballot initiative-oriented
"initiative
constitutional change, which will be referred to as
constitutionalism." This Article argues that under an "among
people" definition of popular constitutionalism, the MCRI cannot
be understood as an expression of popular constitutionalism.
Important consequences flow from this distinction. The distinction
of initiative constitutionalism from popular constitutionalism is
important because the categories' coherence is a prerequisite to
examining the MCRI's merits. Without disaggregating these
models, we risk collapsing the MCRI's effects into the analytic
black hole of "what the people want." Instead, the changes
wrought by the MCRI must be debated on their own terms so that
their consequences can be understood, minimized, and eventually
reversed.
Imbuing the MCRI with the air of popular constitutionalism
makes it more difficult to make this criticism because democratic
sensibilities render Americans hesitant to question expressions of
"popular will." There is a tension between these democratic
sensibilities and what people generally presume the function of
constitutions to be, namely, to lay down basic law dictating how
government will work and to protect basic fundamental rights
from majoritarian tendencies. Americans care about "popular
will" and constitutionalisms, but cannot escape the tension that
results. The challenge is to balance them. 10

part because Kramer's version of popular constitutionalism is grounded in this
history that it makes sense to characterize his modern-era popular
constitutionalism as about being "among people." See infra Part I.
9. I understand this use of historical scholarship not to run aground of the
very persuasive criticisms that Reid and others raise against "law office history."
See, e.g., Reid, supra note 7, at 197-204. I base this understanding on the fact that
I ground my analogical analysis and normative claims not on Hulsebosch's
(decontextualized) historical material, but on his language. See Hulsebosch, supra
note 1 and accompanying text.
10. As Richard Primus has argued: "Taking constitutionalism seriously entails
the willingness to temper simple democracy with other fundamental values. We
love our Constitution, and we love democracy. But we cannot square the circle."
Richard Primus, In the Beginnings, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 24, 2006, at 33 (reviewing
AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY (2005)). To be clear,
however, Primus views as "a romantic obfuscation" popular constitutionalism's
attempt to dissolve the problem that "democratic legitimacy" is incompatible with
the fact that people no longer living ratified the United States Constitution and all
but a few of its amendments. See id. at 30.
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Americans are notably proud of their Federal Constitution
and proud of the fact that they live in a constitutional democracy.
We think of constitutions as sacrosanct founding documents that
tell us who we are; we place ours at the center of our founding
narrative and use it to justify our American exceptionalism.11 We
are proud that we are a nation that both operates under law and
order, and that also protects individual liberties.
Popular constitutionalism and initiative constitutionalism
advance substantially different models for tempering democracy
and other fundamental values. To conflate these models is to
eliminate the chance to debate their merits, and instead to assume
that the products of each one has balanced democracy and other
fundamental values in the same (and proper) way.
This
assumption is worth questioning. In bypassing the affirmative
action debate, then, this Article seeks not to avoid it, but to clarify
the context in which scholars place it. Such a project is especially
important today, because popular constitutionalism is the legal
academy's "theory du jour."12

11. Consider the introduction to the first of the Federalist Papers, which
equates the United States Constitution and the American empire:
AFTER an unequivocal experience of the inefficiency of the subsisting
federal government, you are called upon to deliberate on a new
Constitution for the United States of America. The subject speaks its own
importance; comprehending in its consequences nothing less than the
existence of the UNION, the safety and welfare of the parts of which it is
composed, the fate of an empire in many respects the most interesting in
the world.
THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 1 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
12. See Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?,
118 HARV. L. REV. 1594, 1594 (2005) (reviewing LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE
THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004)).
Hulsebosch has described as a "jurisprudential revolution" the academic
project "in which judicial review is being removed from the center of American
constitutionalism and realigned with the many devices of popular constitutionalism
that the people can use to shape constitutional meaning." Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A
Discrete and Cosmopolitan Minority: The Loyalists, the Atlantic World, and the
Origins of JudicialReview, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 825, 825 (2006).
Indeed, a proliferation of recent scholarship has addressed popular
constitutionalism. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, 1 WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS
(1991) [hereinafter ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS]; BRUCE ACKERMAN, 2 WE THE
PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998); AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A
BIOGRAPHY (2005); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004) [hereinafter KRAMER, PEOPLE
THEMSELVES]; Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism,Circa 2004, 92 CAL. L.
REV. 959 (2004) [hereinafter Kramer, Circa 2004]; Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme
Court, 2000 Term-Foreword: We The Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2001)
[hereinafter Kramer, We The Court]; Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative
Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretationof the Family
and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943 (2003) [hereinafter Post & Siegel,
Policentric];Douglas S. Reed, Popular Constitutionalism:Toward a Theory of State
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To this end, Part I of this Article examines two scholarly
elaborations of popular constitutionalism and argues that, despite
differences between them, they share an appreciation for and are
defined by constitutions that "live among people." Part II turns to
the MCRI, focusing in particular on the claims its proponents
made to justify its placement on the ballot and also articulates a
definition of "initiative constitutionalism." Part III compares
initiative constitutionalism with the definition of popular
constitutionalism discussed in Part I, and argues that initiative
constitutionalism does not and cannot entail constitutions that live
This Article concludes by cautioning against
among people.
identifying all democratic activism with the project of popular
constitutionalism, especially now that popular constitutionalism is
ascendant in the legal academy.
Popular Constitutionalism: Living Among People
Exploring constitutionalism and sovereignty in the context of
the British Empire and colonial America, Hulsebosch observes
that "it is helpful to think of constitutions not as documents but
rather as relationships among jurisdictions and people mediated
through highly charged legal terms."'13 These relationships were
forged not in constitutional texts, but in interactions among
people. "Not a thing," he writes, "the constitution was what people
in concrete places and at specific times made of those legal
traditions."' 14 Contrast this kind of constitution-dynamically
produced and reproduced, made and revised, by daily interaction
in the "demos"' 5-with one that fetishizes the writtenness and
in the latter,
resultant constancy of a particular document:
popular
protect
to
expected
is
order
institutionally-imposed
guarantees
practice
social
to
fidelity
former,
sovereignty; in the
I.

Constitutional Meanings, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 871 (1999) [hereinafter Reed, Popular
Constitutionalism]; Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement
Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the de facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV.
1323 (2006) [hereinafter Siegel, Social Movement Conflict]; Symposium, The People
Themselves: Popular Constitutionalismand Judicial Review, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
809 (2006).
13. DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD, 1664-1830, at
7 (2005) [hereinafter HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE].

14. Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Imperia in Imperio: The Multiple Constitutions of
Empire in New York, 1750-1777, 16 LAW & HIST. REV. 319, 325 (1998).
15. See Robert C. Post, Democratic Constitutionalism and Cultural
Heterogeneity, 25 AUSTL. J. LEG. PHIL. 185, 185 (2000) [hereinafter Post, Cultural
Heterogeneity] ('The collective agency of the people constitutes a 'demos' capable of
'bestowing... democratic authority on a polity."' (citations omitted)).
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it. 16

Hulsebosch's descriptive language helps us understand
popular constitutionalism today. Broadly understood as exploring
"the mechanism that mediates between constitutional law and
culture," 17 the project of popular constitutionalism is to situate
The People at the center of the universe of forces making
constitutional change.1 8 It distinguishes pronouncements about
constitutional meaning imposed by officialdom from meanings that
develop organically through forms of civic activism by ordinary
citizens. 19 Though a single project, there are real and substantial
differences among its explicators that should not be obscured. 20
Nonetheless, they agree more than they disagree, because these
scholars share a commitment to constitutions among people: so
long as ours is a country of popular sovereignty, they assert, the
basic law under which government functions must derive its force
and meaning from The People. This assertion assumes more than
mere passive acceptance of the extant constitutional order, and
requires citizens' engagement as the hallmark of democratic
legitimacy.
A. EstablishingPopular Constitutionalism
This
Article
grounds
its
discussion
of
popular
constitutionalism in the scholarship of two authors whose work
can fairly be described as dominant in this project: Larry Kramer
and Reva Siegel. 21 Kramer and Siegel approach their work in
16. See HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE, supra note 13, at 7-8; cf. Richard
H. Pildes, Democracy and Disorder, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 695, 714 (2001)
("[D]emocracy requires a mix of both order (law, structure, and constraint) and
openness (politics, fluidity, and receptivity to novel forms).").
17. Kramer, Circa 2004, supra note 12, at 983.
18. Id.
19. See Siegel, Social Movement Conflict, supra note 12, at 1324 n.5.
20. See infra notes 29-70 86 and accompanying text.
21. Until recently, Siegel had not aligned herself explicitly with the popular
constitutionalist project; she does not use the term in any of her scholarship from
which I draw, with the exception of one work, in which she and Robert Post
respond to a lecture given by Kramer. Robert Post &- Reva Siegel, Popular
Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy, 92 CAL. L. REV.
1027 (2004) [hereinafter Post & Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism]. Under
Kramer's broad definition of popular constitutionalism, however, Siegel is a
popular constitutionalist because her scholarship explores the relationship between
actions by nonofficial citizens and the development of constitutional meaning. See
supra text accompanying note 17; see also Mark Tushnet, Popular
Constitutionalism as Political Law, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 991, 998 (2006)
(suggesting that Robert Post and Reva Siegel offer a form of popular
constitutionalism).
Indeed, in a very recent article Siegel makes an argument about the
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distinctly different ways. Where Kramer grounds his work in a
history of 19th Century constitutional practices but presents an
popular
vision
of modern
and normative
aspirational
constitutionalism, Siegel draws her conclusions from empirical
research into modern constitutional practice. 22 Where Kramer
writes with an agenda critical of judicial review, Siegel
23
accommodates a culture in which judicial review operates.
Despite these differences, Kramer and Siegel arrive at similar
understandings of the complex ways in which The People should or
do produce constitutional meaning. Both scholars envision worlds
of serious popular engagement: surely The People vote, but they
do not pay attention to politics only in the first weeks in
24
November, otherwise living purely private, apolitical lives.
25
For popular
Instead, The People are often engaged.
constitutionalism it is this constancy of engagement and
constitutional law's accounting for it-for practices of activism
producing and "resting on a shared commitment to the society that
[its] constitution serves" 26-that underpins functional popular
relationship between social movements' debate over gun control laws in the 1970s
through the 2000s, on the one hand, and the form and reasoning of the Supreme
Court's decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008), which
invalidated the District of Columbia's ban on handguns, on the other. See Reva B.
Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122
HARV. L. REV. 191 (2008) [hereinafter Siegel, Dead or Alive]. Her argument in
Dead or Alive runs parallel to her argument about debates over the proposed Equal
Rights Amendment, on the one hand, and the form and reasoning of what she calls
the "de facto ERA," on the other, in a 2006 article. See infra notes 81-85
(discussing the argument in Siegel, Social Movement Conflict, supra note 12);
Siegel, Dead or Alive, supra, at 193 n.10 (noting that this work "builds on earlier
work exploring how movement conflict helps guide the Constitution's development
and how responsive interpretation helps sustain its democratic authority," and
citing Siegel, Social Movement Conflict, supra note 12). Siegel argues that both
Heller itself, and her analyses in Siegel, Dead or Alive and Siegel, Social Movement
Conflict of the role of popular debates and social movements in forming
See Siegel, Dead or
constitutional meaning, reflect popular constitutionalism.
Alive, supra at 192 (describing constitutional "understandings" based on social
movements' debates as being "forged... through popular constitutionalism"); id. at
201 (arguing that Heller "is responsive to popular constitutionalism" and that one
"mode of reasoning" in Heller "sounds in popular constitutionalism").
22. See infra notes 29-80 and accompanying text.
23. Id.
24. See KRAMER, PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 12, at 228 (noting that

generations of Americans have envisaged an active role for themselves as
republican citizens). But see Neal Devins, Tom DeLay: PopularConstitutionalist?,
81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1055, 1056 (2006) ("[The American people have little or no
interest in constitutional interpretation.").
25. KRAMER, PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 12, at 228. But see infra note 93

and accompanying text (noting scholars' questioning of Kramer's fundamental
imputation of agency to The People).
26. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE, supra note 13, at 7. Again, reference
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sovereignty.
In the popular constitutionalist model, the line between
constitutional law and mere political law blurs. Indeed, the
essential point of popular constitutionalism is its recognition of
distinctly constitutional value in citizens' activity too often
understood as having none. 27 As the gap between The People and
the Constitution narrows, conventional pathologies preventing us
28
from linking politics and the Constitution will also fade.
Kramer grounds his popular constitutionalism in the
Founding Era. 29 He valorizes citizens who acted in a manner that
tangibly embodied-and produced-their Constitution, a legal
instrument whose "day-to-day enforcement" and meaning The
People effected with their daily actions. 30 In the Founding Era,
"[m]eans of correction and forms of resistance were well
established and highly structured" and included voting,
assembling, petitioning, and public denouncement.31 When public
dissatisfaction with officialdom did not find sufficient outlet in
pamphlets and the voting booth, the public could utilize "more
aggressive forms of resistance." 32 Mere disobedience or explicit
rejection of local authorities often sufficed when, for example, a
prosecutor sought to indict and convict an individual whom the
community thought should not be punished. 33 The People could
raise the stakes even higher: "more coercive means of popular
to Hulsebosch should not suggest that he is a popular constitutionalist; his
scholarship is oriented historically, not normatively, on these questions. See
discussion supranote 9.
27. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE, supra note 13, at 9.
28. See KRAMER, PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supranote 12, at 30-34; Tushnet, supra
note 21 at 998 (discussing constitutional law as political law); infra notes 97-100
and accompanying text.
29. See KRAMER, PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 12, at 9-34. Hulsebosch
discusses the soundness of Kramer's historical account, and its distinction from
'law office history" or "law review history." See Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Bringing The
People Back In, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 653, 663-87 (2005) [hereinafter Hulsebosch,
Bringing] (reviewing LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004)); see also Christopher Tomlins,
Politics, Police, Past and Present: Larry Kramer's The People Themselves, 81 CHI.KENT L. REV. 1007, 1007-10 (2006) (reviewing LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE
THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDIcIAL REVIEW (2004)).
30. See KRAMER, PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 12, at 9-34.
31. Id. at 25.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 26. One extreme form of this phenomenon was jury nullification, but
sometimes grand juries declined to indict. Id. ("[Jiuries could become a potent
weapon with which to frustrate any local official foolish enough to enforce laws the
community deemed unconstitutional."); see also Kramer, We The Court, supra note
12, at 100-01 ("[Ihe jury ... used its power to retain control over substantive
law.").
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opposition were available," 34 such as boycotts and mobbing. 35
As Kramer repeatedly stresses, The People was. not a
It was "a collective body capable of
rhetorical abstraction.
independent action and expression" that would "directijy]
supervis[e] and correct[]" its government. 36 This collective body
demonstrated such power constantly, in physical, political, and
intellectual ways. 37 These methods of control were not only
38
theoretic possibilities. People wrote pamphlets and articles,
juries nullified verdicts, 39 groups organized boycotts 40 and mobs
dumped tea into the Boston harbor. 41 In Kramer's view, both
before and after the founding, The People voiced their
42
disagreement with government through action.
The People's goal was to effect changes in "fundamental
Unlike "ordinary law" passed by duly constituted
law."43
governmental bodies (i.e., legislatures) to regulate people,
"fundamental law" was the law governing the governors. 44 Under
the theory of popular sovereignty on which the United States
Constitution was written and ratified, Kramer argues, it was
"fundamental law" that The People owned, and whose meaning
The People had the power to make. 45 In the Founding Era,
"fundamental law" lived among people.
Kramer argues that the Constitution's character as
"fundamental law" was lost when "the critical linguistic difference
between [the Constitution] and ordinary law blurred" under the
weight of Supreme Court cases treating the Constitution as

34. KRAMER, PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 12, at 26-27.
35. Id. (noting that "mobbing was an accepted ...form of political action"); see
also HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE, supra note 13, at 7 ('The English
remedy [for constitutional violations] was the right of resistance, with its graduated
steps of petition, riot, rebellion, and finally revolution.").
36. KRAMER, PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 12, at 30.
37. Id. at 27-30.
38. Id. at 25 ('The first phase of American resistance to the Stamp Act
consisted of petitions beseeching Parliament to reject the offending legislation.").
Consider that the FederalistPapers were newspaper op-eds published in New York
newspapers. See Introduction to THE FEDERALIST, at viii (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
39. KRAMER, PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 12, at 26.
40. Id. (noting that citizens would boycott assisting the local sheriff who
depended on local community support to arrest law breakers).
41. See KRAMER, PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 12, at 3-5, 18, 24-29.

42. See id.; Kramer, We The Court, supra note 12, at 11-12.
43. KRAMER, PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 12, at 30.
44. Id. (quoting Judge William Nelson). The phrase "governing the governors"
paraphrases Judge William Nelson. See id.
45. See KRAMER, PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 12, at 30.
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ordinary law. 46 Over time, "the Constitution at last came to seem
like ordinary law."47 At the same time, "popular politics" was
absorbed "into the party system," so that legislatures came to be
seen as the embodiment of "the 'voice of the people"' and it became
"hardly comprehensible to speak of 'the people' as a corporate
entity capable of independent action." 48 As a result, Kramer's
argument for modern popular constitutionalism is at times
dependent on legislators faithfully representing the voice of the
46. Kramer, We the Court, supranote 12, at 99.
47. Id.; see also KRAMER, PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 12, at 148-56
(discussing "the assimilation of constitutional law into ordinary law").
48. Kramer, We The Court, supra note 12, at 99-104. Kramer further explains:
As the new politics settled and became normalized, the role of "the
people" in it slowly changed. By serving as mediating institutions
between governed and governors, parties obscured the formerly sharp
theoretical distinction that had existed between them . . . . [A]nd
because party politics was all about winning office, popular politics
ceased to be something that operated from outside the formal system
as a check on its political institutions. The "voice of the people," as
such, was now expressed by elected representatives responding to
political signals and popular movements.
Id. at 103-04; see also KRAMER, PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 12, at 37. The
history of voting methods tracked this move from the street (where, when voting
was done publicly, citizens faced violence and resistance when casting unpopular
votes) to the ballot box (where votes are cast in secret). See Jill Lepore, Annals of
Democracy: Rock, Paper,Scissors: How We Used to Vote, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 13,
2008, at 90, 92, 96 (noting that "Americans used to vote with their voices-viva
voce-or with their hands or with their feet ....
In the colonies, as in the mother
country, casting a vote rarely required paper and pen." With today's secret ballots,
by contrast,
[a voter will] enter a booth built on a frame of aluminum poles, tug
shut behind [her] a red-white-and-blue striped curtain, and, with a
black marker tied to a string, [will] mark [her] ballot, awed, as always,
by the gravity, the sovereignty, of the moment. With the stroke of a
pen, we, mere citizens, become We the People.
Id.
Daryl Levinson and Rick Pildes also chronicle the rise of the political
parties vis-A-vis constitutional structure. See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H.
Pildes, Separation of Parties,Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2316-29 (2006).
Levinson and Pildes argue that the fact that the Founding Fathers did not
anticipate and would not approve of the parties' domination of American politics
renders the Madisonian compromise-based theory underpinning the Supreme
Court's separation of powers jurisprudence anachronistic. Id.
Separation of powers is sometimes understood as serving to protect both
individual liberties and democratic accountability. See Clinton v. City of N.Y., 524
U.S. 417, 450 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[The Framers] used the principles
of separation of powers and federalism to secure liberty in the fundamental
political sense of the term, quite in addition to the idea of freedom from intrusive
governmental acts."); infra notes 88-90 and accompanying text (discussing the role
of judicial review in popular constitutionalism). To the extent that separation of
powers actually fosters democratic accountability, Levinson and Pildes raise
important questions about the relationship between political parties' domination of
politics, and the people's ability to govern themselves and shape their
Constitution's meaning effectively. See Levinson & Pildes, supra, at 2316-29.
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people and willing to assert the power to interpret the
49
Constitution.
In the abstract, Kramer clearly wants to return to an
intimate and responsive relationship between the Constitution
and The People. 50 He insists that that we "payf careful attention
to constitutional visions generated outside the official organs of
the state," 51 and that we must "lay claim to the Constitution
ourselves." 52 But Kramer's suggestions are unhelpful to those
seeking particular examples of popular action's constitutional
valence today. He says only that popular constitutionalists must
"control the Supreme Court" by "deflect[ing] ...arguments that
constitutional law is too complex or difficult for ordinary
53
citizens."
As Kramer gets less abstract about the relationship between
The People and the Constitution, his suggestions for how such a
relationship would function become vaguer. He is horrified to
observe that when the Supreme Court ended Florida's vote recount
and effectively declared George W. Bush the winner of the 2000
presidential election, 54 people upset with the decision did
nothing.55 Drawing on historical examples, he insists they might
have "attempted to impeach the Justices" or "moved to slash the
56
Court's budget" or "tried to pack the Court with new members."
Kramer's hope for modern-era popular constitutionalism is that we
rediscover and assert with force our role as authoritative
constitutional interpreters. 57
It is surprising that Kramer does not observe that political

49. See KRAMER, PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 12, at 213-26 (discussing the
"New Deal settlement," which entails a judicial review deferential to political (read:
legislative) assertions of constitutionality). But see Alexander & Solum, supra note
12, at 1600-01 (describing Kramer's argument with skepticism and observing that
"when a strong President ignores the Constitution, or a strong Congress attempts
to institute rump parliamentary democracy, it is institutions and not 'We the
People' who are acting." (citations omitted)).
50. See KRAMER, PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 12, at 7-8.
51. Kramer, Circa 2004, supra note 12, at 980. According to Kramer, doing so
"is important, if for no other reason than the certainty that our own sense of the
good will be improved by a more catholic sense of the possible." Id. On this
"catholic sense," see SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 18-51 (1988).
52. KRAMER, PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supranote 12, at 247.
53. Id. at 247-48; see also Kramer, We The Court, supranote 12, at 153-58.
54. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
55. See KRAMER, PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supranote 12, at 231.
56. Id.
57. Cf. id. at 228 ("Neither the Founding generation nor their children nor their
children's children, right on down to our grandparents' generation, were so passive
about their role as republican citizens.").
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and constitutional change actually often does happen by methods
of which it seems he would approve. Indeed, today we still
exercise some of the same basic forms of resistance as our colonial
forebears:
we still vote, exercise the right to petition and
assemble, and make public denouncements.58 Community mores
still mark the limits of official action in other informal ways, even
outside the First Amendment, whose jurisprudence explicitly
invokes "community standards of decency." 59 Juries still nullify
convictions.60
Activists still organize boycotts. 61 Organized
groups still gather in the streets to protest and oppose presidential

action. 62
Moreover, as Siegel argues in her pathbreaking article Text
in Contest: Gender and the Constitution from a Social Movement
Perspective ("Text in Contest"),63 the United States Constitution
already is a document whose meaning is derived from these
popularly negotiated solutions. 64 Siegel posits that constitutional
meanings flow from the dialectic between movements and
countermovements. 65 Instead of providing a purely normative
58. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing the use of these
tactics in the Founding Era).
59. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 31 (1973) (defining obscenity by
reference to community standards).
60. See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond, Beyond Fantasy and Nightmare: A
Portraitof the Jury, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 717, 752 (2006) (reviewing empirical studies
of the jury, and observing that "even if it is rare, explicit jury nullification of the
application of the law plays a central role in conceptions of the jury and has been a
source of extensive debate"); see also Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury
Nullification, 105 YALE L.J. 677 (1995) (arguing that race-based jury nullification is
appropriate in some cases).
61. See, e.g., Dolores Huerta & Peter Edelman, Keynote Address, Symposium
on Economic Justice and Growing Inequality in America, 3 HASTINGS RACE &
POVERTY L.J. 203, 205, 210 (2006) ("[T]he thing that really helped farm workers
was . . . when we had that famous grape boycott, when we had fourteen million
Americans who would not eat grapes .... In the grape boycott, fourteen million
Americans stopped eating grapes. So we know that we can do this.").
62. Consider, for example, the massive anti-war protests in the month before
President Bush launched the war in Iraq. See Jodi Wilgoren, In Word, Song and
Sign, DemonstratorsAcross the United States Say No to an Invasion of Iraq, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 16, 2003, at 21. It is interesting to note that in the index to The People
Themselves: Popular Constitutionalismand Judicial Review, under "popular will,"
Kramer lists only: "See protests." KRAMER, PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 12, at
357.
63. Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution from a Social
Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297 (2001) [hereinafter Siegel, Text in
Contest].
64. Id. at 299.
65. Id. at 303; see also Siegel, Social Movement Conflict, supra note 12 (arguing
that the "de facto ERA," a series of cases in which the Supreme Court came to
understand gender discrimination as violative of the Equal Protection Clause, was
produced not solely by judicial review or by ambient and amorphous "culture," but
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account of how The People should participate in the making of
constitutional meaning, Siegel instead takes a positive approach,
arguing that meaning simply is made by social movement66
In her account, "[c]laims on the
countermovement interactions.
mobilized groups of Americans
by
text of the Constitution made
into being the understandings
bring
outside the courthouse helped
the Constitution." 67 Because
of
text
that judges then read into the
"pathways of meaning" allow both "law [to] structure social life"
and "social actors [to] shape law," the boundaries between law and
society are unfixed. 66 Like Kramer, Siegel aims to blur the strict
Because there is little
politics/constitutional law divide.
"normative coherence within law and society .. . [or] between
them," 69 we cannot determine that particular actions do not have
constitutional value based solely on the forum in which they
0

occur. 7

Siegel has extensively studied politics and social movements,
and has located such movements on the frontier between law and
Examining the nature of the claims that social
society. 71
movements make, she suggests that their arguments often sound
in constitutional law because citizens understand the Constitution
to allow them to make such arguments: the first three words of
72
that document-"We the People" -reflect a theory of popular
sovereignty and suggest an authorship that citizens reasonably
believe to include themselves. 73

by a dialectic of claims on constitutional meaning between feminist and antifeminist social movements from the late 1960s until the early 1980s).
66. See Siegel, Text in Contest, supra note 63, at 303 ("[Dlialogue between
citizenry and judiciary about constitutional meaning is far more commonplace in
our constitutional order than constitutional theory commonly acknowledges.").
67. Id. at 312-13 (emphasis added).
68. Id. at 316-18.
69. Id. at 316-17. Siegel makes this argument while characterizing an article
that distinguishes between law and society as offering a "high degree of normative
coherence." Id. (discussing David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional
Amendments, 144 HARV. L. REV. 1457 (2001)).
70. See Siegel, Text in Contest, supra note 63, at 316-17. In other words, for
popular constitutionalists, the fact that an argument takes place outside of a
federal courthouse does not, and should not, render it invisible or meaningless to
the Constitution.
71. See, e.g., Siegel, Social Movement Conflict, supra note 12, at 1323-24
(noting that the 1970s feminist movement's push for the Equal Rights Amendment
likely influenced the Supreme Court's subsequent interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibiting sex discrimination).
72. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
73. See Siegel, Text in Contest, supra note 63, at 322; see also Tomlins, supra
note 29, at 1012 ('The Preamble is indubitably the best claim the people can make
that the Constitution is 'theirs."').
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In this way Siegel contests Kramer's argument that The
People have lost sight of their obligations as sovereign.
If
"mobilized groups of citizens" make claims on constitutional
meaning "with the expectation that [court-exposited] law might in
fact change by reason of their claims," 74 they cannot also fulfill
Kramer's caricature of them being "passive about their role as
republican citizens." 75
If The People already "elaborate the
Constitution's meaning with respect to different institutions and
practices" by "mak[ing] claims that the Constitution, as
foundational law, speaks to various controversies," 76 then the
informal processes that Kramer hopes will "challengeo,
reinterpret[], and renew[]" constitutional understandings, 77
already "continually refresh the text's normative ambit."78 In
other words, Kramer and Siegel disagree about the extent to which
The
People
already
develop
constitutional
meaning. 79
Nevertheless, they share an understanding, whether aspirational
or empirical, of constitutional law based on continual popular
80
involvement.
This Article embraces an understanding of popular
constitutionalism based on these studies and the project of
dismantling the politics/constitutional law distinction. Because
the United States Constitution invokes and is grounded in popular
sovereignty, we must give constitutional weight to social or
political actions based on their democratic pedigree. As popular
activity-The
People's
politics-demands
constitutional
significance, the Constitution moves toward, and eventually "lives
among," The People. The goal, and this Article's normative
orientation, is to acknowledge that political engagement and sociopolitical pressures by which personal and group relationships form
and negotiate solutions to conflict are indeed matters of
constitutional import.

74. Siegel, Text in Contest, supra note 63, at 322.
75. KRAMER, PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 12, at 228.

76. Siegel, Text in Contest, supra note 63, at 324.
77. Kramer, We The Court, supra note 12, at 15-16.
78. Siegel, Text in Contest, supra note 63, at 324.
79. Cf. Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577
(1993) [hereinafter Friedman, Dialogue] (arguing that factual premises
underpinning the countermajoritarian difficulty may be untrue or overstated).
80. See, e.g., KRAMER, PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note

12; Kramer, Circa

2004, supra note 12; Siegel, Social Movement Conflict, supranote 12; Siegel, Text in
Contest, supra note 63.
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Siegel's insight is well grounded in a history that dictates and
81
In the
corresponds to her description of constitutional change.
late 1960s through the early 1980s, Siegel explains, proponents
and opponents of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) wrote opeds and books, litigated constitutional claims, lobbied legislatures,
started newsletters, testified before Congress, and protested in the
streets.8 2 By adjusting their arguments in response to the ongoing
debate, both sides produced as their shared legacy the "de facto
84
Equal
Supreme Court's post-Reed v. Reed
ERA" 3-the
Protection Clause gender discrimination jurisprudence, which
Justice Ginsburg has described as having "no practical difference"
from the ERA as originally proposed.85
popular
of
conception
nuanced
Siegel's
Under
form
some
for
room
making
problem
no
is
there
constitutionalism,
86
context.
particular
a
within
occurs
it
because
review,
of judicial
Social contest creates a framework for judicial decision-making

81. See Siegel, Text in Contest, supra note 63, at 306 ("One needs a positive
account of the roles that different institutions and actors have played in shaping
the Constitution's meaning before one can build a normative theory that defines
relationships among institutions and actors who make conflicting claims about the
Constitution's meaning."); see also Siegel, Social Movement Conflict, supra note 12,
at 1340 ("I offer this account as an interpretation of an ongoing practice, rather
than a justification of it.").
82. See Siegel, Social Movement Conflict, supranote 12, at 1366-1418.
83. See id. at 1332-34.
84. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
85. See Siegel, Social Movement Conflict, supra note 12, at 1334 (quoting
Justice Ginsburg in Jeffrey Rosen, The New Look of Liberalism on the Court, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 5, 1997, § 6 (Magazine), at 60). A particularly important case in the
development of the "de facto ERA" is United States v. Virginia, which explained
that "[p]arties who seek to defend gender-based government action must
demonstrate an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for that action," and described
judicial review of gender-based state action as "skeptical scrutiny." United States
v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 51, 531 (1996) (citations omitted).
86. This conception is in contradistinction to Kramer, who seems hostile to
judicial review, at least insofar as it has led to "judicial supremacy," in which the
Supreme Court dictates constitutional meaning without regard to others'
preferences. See KRAMER, PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 12, at 93-226; Kramer,
We The Court, supra note 12, at 14-15, 74-158. In two recent articles Robert Post
and Reva Siegel argue that the Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence regarding
Congress's power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment demonstrates that
the Court has recently departed from a "policentric" model of judicial review
prevalent in the 1960s, which explicitly leaves room for nonjudicial constitutional
interpretations, and instead has adopted a "juricentric" model of judicial supremacy
in which the Court is the only expositor of constitutional meaning. See Post &
Siegel, Policentric, supra note 12; see also Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel,
Protecting the Constitutionfrom the People: JuricentricRestrictions on Section Five
Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Post & Siegel, Juricentric].
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that renders either moot or overstated the countermajoritarian
difficultys7 with which Kramer seems so concerned.8 8 Moreover,
judicial review affirmatively serves an important purpose for
popular constitutionalism: it produces finality in specific cases
about individual litigants' rights vis-A-vis each other and all
individuals' rights vis-i-vis the government. This judicial function
spurs societal dialogue on constitutional meaning by protecting a
perimeter of freedom in which citizens can exercise their
"democracy enhancing" rights.89
As Post and Siegel write,
"judicial supremacy and popular constitutionalism... are in fact
dialectically interconnected and have long coexisted." 90
Commentators have questioned the nature of The People that
is portrayed in Kramer's version of popular constitutionalism.91
One review suggests that despite his "fine rhetoric," Kramer
leaves unclear exactly what The People do and whether they
"make," "enforce," or "interpret" the Constitution--or do
something
else entirely. 92 Furthermore, it also calls into question Kramer's
fundamental imputation of agency to The People, arguing that in
Kramer's scheme, "it is institutions and not 'We the People' who
are acting." 93 Even though, in Kramer's regime, popular activity
enjoys a presumption of constitutional valence, he is unclear about
when, exactly, constitutional law must (or should) acknowledge

87. See Siegel, Social Movement Conflict, supra note 12, at 1327
("[C]onstitutional culture . . . giv[es] rise to conflict that can discipline
constitutional advocacy into understandings that officials can enforce and the
public will recognize as the Constitution."); cf. Friedman, Dialogue, supra note 79,
at 581 ("All segments of society participate in this constitutional interpretive
dialogue, but . . . [c]ourts serve to facilitate and mold the national dialogue
concerning the meaning of the Constitution.").
88. See, e.g., KRAMER, PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 12, at 93-226.

89. Post & Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 21, at 1036; see also
id. ("Constitutional rights may instantiate the very values that democracy seeks to
establish, and they may also be necessary to the discursive formation of popular
will upon which democracy is based ....
[I]n some circumstances popular
constitutionalism may actually require constitutional rights for its realization.");
Friedman, Dialogue, supra note 79, at 652 ("In reality, the process of constitutional
interpretation is dynamic, not static.").
90. Post & Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism,supra note 21, at 1029.
91. See, e.g., Alexander & Solum, supra note 12.
92. Id. at 1598, 1600-02, 1616-19.
93. Id. at 1600-01; see also id. at 1606-07 (discussing "methodological
individualism'); Devins, supra note 24, at 1056 (suggesting "practical problems
associated with implementing" popular constitutionalism through legislatures,
including interest divergence of legislators from the people); David L. Franklin,
Popular Constitutionalism as Presidential Constitutionalism?, 81 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1069 (2006) (suggesting that Kramer's argument for non-judicial, institutional
constitutionalism likely entails ascension of presidential, not congressional,
constitutional interpretation).
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collective action. 94 Though Kramer's project seems to be to
95
question "how to recover [The People's] agentive capacity," he
provides little guidance to scholars looking for specific evidence of
96
that agency.
These ambiguities largely stem from disagreement about the
97
As Mark
constitution's "political law" and "basic law" qualities.
Tushnet observes, Kramer emphasizes constitutional law's
"political law" component via its "typically ... different rhetoric
from normal politics, even though it takes the same form that
Commentators concerned with the
normal politics does." 98
practicalities of implementing popular constitutionalism worry
that blurring the constitutional-political line will destroy
99
constitutional law's special role in governing the governors.
Today we may be confused and concerned by the blurring of lines
between "mere politics" and constitutional law, but this blur is
exactly what Kramer and Siegel suggest either should or does
happen. 100
On this point, Siegel is in clarifying juxtaposition to Kramer.
Both clearly place constitutional weight on popular activity-even
outside election-related contexts. 10 1 For instance, as Siegel notes,
ERA opponent Phyllis Schlafly did not organize only around
elections; 102 when Kramer's activists "publicly repudiat[e]
Justices," they too engage in activity expressly not centered on
election day. 103 Read together, Siegel and Kramer make clear that
for popular constitutionalism, The People define the constitution
to the extent their daily and constant engagement with politics
demands that power.
Siegel is explicit in describing the times during which citizen
"Such
always. 104
engagement guides constitutional change:

94. See Alexander & Solum, supranote 12, at 1616-19.
95. Tomlins, supra note 29, at 1014.
96. See Alexander & Solum, supranote 12, at 1618-19.
97. See Tushnet, supra note 21, at 991-93 & 992 n.3.
98. Id. at 996.
99. See id. at 999-1000.
100. See Tushnet, supra note 21.
101. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
102. See Siegel, Social Movement Conflict, supra note 12, at 1391-1403
(chronicling Schlafly's activism).
103. See KRAMER, PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 12, at 247; see generally U.S.
CONST.art. III, § 1 (granting federal judges life tenure and thus keeping them at a
remove from electoral politics).
104. See, e.g., Siegel, Text in Contest, supra note 63, at 308-09 (noting that
during the decade leading up to the "de facto ERA," "practices of litigation,
lobbying, and legislation; techniques of mass mobilization and protest; and
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interactions," she writes, "include but are not limited to
lawmaking and adjudication; confirmation hearings, ordinary
legislation, failed amendments, campaigns for elective office, and
protest marches all may provide occasion for citizen deliberation
and mobilization and for official action in response to
constitutional claims." 0 5
Constitutional argument-that is,
constitutional politics-occurs in legislative settings, in the
streets, and elsewhere.
It is precisely this kind of constant activism and engagement
that places The People, not judges, at the center of constitutional
meaning. For popular constitutionalists, The People and the
constitution inhabit the same analytic and social spaces. This, in
other words, is why we can understand and define popular
constitutionalism by its insistence that constitutions live among
people.
Part III returns to this "among people" definition of popular
constitutionalism to assess its effects on our understanding of
initiative constitutionalism and thus of the MCRI. But first,
Part II introduces the MCRI and addresses the forms of citizen
engagement imagined by initiative constitutionalism.
II. Initiative Constitutionalism: Fetishizing Texts
In 1995, Jennifer Gratz was waitlisted and ultimately denied
admission by the University of Michigan. 106 Her rejection from
the flagship Ann Arbor campus sparked eleven years of activism in
fighting race-based affirmative action programs. 107 She became
the lead plaintiff in an attack on the University of Michigan's
affirmative action program used for undergraduate admissions. 108
In deciding her claim, the United States Supreme Court held that
the program violated the Equal Protection Clause. o 9 The Court,
however, did not find affirmative action programs per se

strategies of communication" were instrumental in the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment).
105. Siegel, Social Movement Conflict, supra note 12, at 1324-25.
106. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 251 (2003).
107. See generally Dawson Bell, Election 2006: Affirmative Action: Iron Will
Drives Leader for Ban: Gratz Hated, Praised for Pushing Prop 2, DETROIT FREE
PRESS, Oct. 30, 2006, at 1A. [hereinafter Bell, Iron Will] (providing a brief profile of
Gratz); Mich. Civil Rights Initiative, Biography of Jennifer Gratz - Executive
Director, http://www.michigancivilrights.org/jengratzbio.html (last visited Sept. 20,
2008) (providing a brief profile of Gratz).
108. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 252.
109. See id. at 275 (invalidating the undergraduate school's affirmative action
policy).
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unconstitutional. 110 The ambiguity of the Court's decisions in
Gratz and an accompanying case, Grutter v. Bollinger,11 1 led Gratz2
to organize and direct a group that sought to pass the MCRI,11
which would (and did) amend the text of the Michigan
Constitution to bar the State from "discriminat[ing] against, or
grant[ing] preferential treatment to, any individual or group on
the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin .... ,"113
This group was not alone in urging amendment to state
constitutions; Ward Connerly, the chairman of the American Civil
Rights Institute, had previously organized a ballot initiative in
California that successfully sought to add almost exactly the same
text to that state's constitution 11 4 as the MCRI has now added to
Michigan's. 115
In the months leading up to the November 2006 election in
which Michiganders passed the MCRI, debate over the MCRI was
fierce. 116 One United Michigan, a massive coalition of community,
business, and political leaders, was formed to defeat the
initiative,11 7 and Gratz appeared in national media to advocate for
it. 118 Much of the debate focused on the merits of affirmative
action and on the scope of the proposed amendment, as well as the
110. See id.; see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding the
University of Michigan Law School's affirmative action policy).
111. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
112. Mich. Civil Rights Initiative, supra note 107.
113. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26.
114. Proposition 209, known also as the California Civil Rights Initiative, was
adopted into the California Constitution by ballot initiative in November of 1996.
Compare CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 31(a) ("The state shall not discriminate against, or
grant preferential treatment to . . . in the operation of public employment, public
education, or public contracting.") with MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26(2) ("The state
shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to . . . in the
operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting."); see also
American Civil Rights Institute, States & Legislation,
http://www.acri.org/legislation.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2008) (discussing similar
ballot initiatives throughout the country).
115. See Egan, supra note 4.
116. See generally Tamar Lewin, Campaign to End Race Preferences Splits
Michigan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2006, at Al [hereinafter Lewin, Campaign Splits
Michigan] (discussing the debate over the MCRI).
117. Id.; see also One United Michigan, About Us,
http://www.oneunitedmichigan.org/About/index.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2007);
Detroit Regional Chamber, One United Michigan Coalition,
(last
http://www.detroitchamber.compublicaffairs/index.asp?cid=4&rcid= 141
visited Oct. 29, 2008) (listing members of One United Michigan); Ward Connerly, It
is Time to End Race-Based "Affirmative Action," 1 U. ST. THOMAS J. LAW & PUB.
POL. 56, 61 (2007) ("Michigan's entire political, business, and labor establishment
has united in opposition to MCRI and to support preferences [in a] broad coalition
of elites operating under the name of 'One United Michigan.").
118. See Mich. Civil Rights Initiative, supra note 107.
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effects the MCRI would have on higher education and the state's
economy.119 A notable portion of the rhetoric was also shaped by
the form in which this particular constitutional change would
happen:
by a "direct democracy" ballot initiative on which
Michiganders would vote directly, and with which they could
change the constitution's text.1 20 The MCRI passed by a 58-42
121
percent margin.
My purpose here is not to criticize Gratz or those who rose up
in opposition to the MCRI, or to engage in the merits of their
disagreement. 122 Their passion was not misplaced: the textual
changes wrought by the MCRI have had, and will continue to
have, substantial effects on universities and university applicants,
business owners contracting with the city, and many others. 123 So
too will the passage of the MCRI have a substantial impact on the
discourse of affirmative action both in Michigan and nationwide.
This Article also declines to criticize their election-day focus. It
was not irrational for the MCRI's proponents and opponents to
focus on ballot initiative elections as moments of constitutional
change or on constitutional texts as sites of that change. The text
of Michigan's Constitution, as well as the kind of state action it
had been understood to allow, both changed drastically because of
119. See Lewin, Campaign Splits Michigan, supra note 116, at Al; Editorial, All
of Michigan Loses with Prop 06-2, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Oct. 31, 2006, at 8A;
Letter from Ward Connerly to Jennifer M. Granholm, Governor of Michigan (Mar.
17, 2006), http://www.michigancivilrights.org/medialconnerly-letter.03172006.pdf.
120. See, e.g., Associated Press, Bouchard Opposes Affirmative Action Ballot
Issue, Nov. 8, 2005, http://www.westlaw.com (follow "News" hyperlink; then follow
'Wires" hyperlink; then search "Bouchard opposes affirmative action ballot") ('We
are voting for a specific amendment to our state constitution .... [it is important
that we get it right .. "'(citation omitted)).
121. Of the 3,696,701 votes cast, 2,141,010 supported the MCRI, and 1,555,691
opposed it. Michigan Department of State, 2006 Official Michigan General Election
Results - State Proposal. 06-2: ConstitutionalAmendment: Ban Affirmative Action
Programs, http://miboecfr.nictusa.com/election/results/O6GEN/900OO002.html (last
visited Nov. 7, 2008). The margin in Nebraska (58Vo-42%) was even larger, and the
margin by which voters in Colorado rejected a similar measure was exceedingly
small (50.8%-49.2%). Supra note 4.
122. See supra notes 5, 6 and accompanying text.
123. See, e.g., Khaled Ali Beydoun, Without Color of Law: The Losing Race
Against Colorblindness in Michigan, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 465, 506 (2007) ("In
addition to abolishing affirmative action and ancillary programs, the MCRI will
levy a chilling effect on even the investigation of patently legal strategies to
increase create [sic] campus diversity."); accord Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Can Michigan
Universities Use Proxies for Race After the Ban on Racial Preferences?, 13 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 277 (2007) [hereinafter Fitzpatrick, After the Ban] (discussing the
potential effects of the MCRI). But see Eryn Hadley, Did the Sky Really Fall? Ten
Years After California's Proposition 209, 20 BYU J. PUB. L. 103, 117-35 (2005)
(arguing that Proposition 209 in California, which contains phrasing identical to
the MCRI, has not had substantial negative effects on women or people of color).
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votes cast on November 7, 2006. Nor does this Article seek to
attack ballot initiatives per se.
Instead, this Article employs Gratz's and others' words to
explore notions of constitutional change underpinning ballot
initiatives, the mechanism with which these advocates were all
It calls these notions "initiative
immediately concerned.
constitutionalism." The nature of initiative constitutionalism
underpins this Article's argument that ballot initiatives are not
popular constitutionalist enterprises. The subset of the debate
over the MCRI that addresses and/or implicates initiative
constitutionalism reflects those characteristics of initiative
constitutionalism that put it at odds with the definition of popular
constitutionalism elaborated in Part I. By focusing so heavily on
an initiative's potential to modify a constitution's text, initiative
constitutionalism obstinately fails to accord popular action itself
any independent, constitutionally relevant weight.
A. Debating the MCRI
For both proponents and opponents of the MCRI, November
7, 2006 was an important day. "With the Nov. 7 election drawing
near, both sides in the affirmative-action debate are ramping up
their efforts to convince undecided Michiganders how they should
124
vote on Proposal 2[j," observed one news report in late October.
The month before, one commentator wrote, "This November, we
125
face a critical decision which has huge implications for women."
Reacting to poll numbers indicating declining support for the
MCRI, Gratz said, "Until people sit down and read the language,
the numbers will bounce around .... I think people will pay more
David Waymire, a
attention as the election gets closer." 126
spokesman for One United Michigan, said before the election that
organizing to defeat the proposal "[i]s tough. Two years ago, the
initial polling found more than two-thirds supported the
proposition. The miracle is that we've gotten it into a winnable
127
range."
This focus on the election was entirely understandable. With
the initiative on the ballot, the election results would (and did)

124. Suzette Hackney & Peggy Walsh-Sarnecki, Affirmative Action: Battle Heats
Up as Election Nears, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Oct. 17, 2006, at lB.
125. Anne Doyle, Other Voices: Affirmative Action a Step Forward, CRAIN'S
DETROIT BUSINESS, Sept. 25, 2006, at 9 (arguing against passage of the MCRI).
126. Dawson Bell, Affirmative Action Proposal Loses Support: Poll Shows Ban
Faces Challenge, DETROIT FREE PRESS, July 18, 2006, at 3A.
127. Lewin, CampaignSplits Michigan,supra note 116, at A20.
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change the text of the state's constitution. Its outcome would (and
does) affect a number of important issues, including whether the
University of Michigan's undergraduate admissions affirmative
action programs would be left intact and whether municipalities
could seek to contract specifically with minority- and women8
owned businesses. 12
The outcome of the election effected a change in the text of
Michigan's Constitution,' 29 the legal instrument granting the
government the power to constitute itself and to govern the state's
citizens. 30
Gratz recognized the "basic law" nature of the
document whose text she sought to change; she explained the
initiative in terms referencing "the people" and thus sounding in
popular sovereignty. 131 When a federal court ruled against
plaintiffs who had alleged fraud in MCRI's collection of signatures
on a petition to get the initiative on the ballot, 132 Gratz said, "We
are happy that [the judge] ruled that the people are allowed to
decide this issue ... ."133 After the election she again invoked this
terminology, saying, "The people of Michigan have spoken."' 134
And she was not the only one. The Detroit Free Press, which
opposed the MCRI, editorialized that the election "will afford a
chance for the people of Michigan to assess some pretty basic
values and decide whether the painful social progress made to
date-with imperfect results-will continue or be set back in the
decades to come."135
For those who organized around the MCRI, the focus on
128. See Dawson Bell, What Stays, Goes is Decided in Court, DETROIT FREE
PRESS, Sept. 5, 2006, at 9A.
129. See MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26.
130. See id. art. III.
131. See e.g., Press Release, Mich. Civil Rights Initiative, Remarks of Jennifer
Gratz, Executive Director, Mich. Civil Rights Initiative Comm'n. (Jan. 6, 2005),
http://www.michigancivilrights.org/media/JG-10605-remarks.pdf [hereinafter Gratz
Remarks] ("Michiganders will say no to dividing people . . . Michiganders will say
no to discrimination ... ").
132. See Operation King's Dream v. Connerly, No. 06-12773, 2006 WL 2514115,
at *1 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2006) (finding that MCRI proponents had not violated
the Voting Rights Act, but describing their actions as "unprincipled"), affd 501 F.3d
584 (6th Cir. 2007).
133. Jim Irwin, Judge Rules Anti-Affirmative-Action Proposal Can Stay on
Ballot, Aug. 30, 2006, http://www.westlaw.com (follow "News" hyperlink; then
follow 'Wires" hyperlink; then search "anti-affirmative action proposal") (emphasis
added).
134. All Things Considered (National Public Radio radio broadcast Nov. 10,
2006), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6469307
(emphasis added).
135. Editorial, On the Ballot: Focus the MCRI Debate on Injustice, Not
Signatures,DETROIT FREE PRESS, Mar. 31, 2006, at 12A (emphasis added).
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popular sovereignty was also a focus on elections as the
paradigmatic moment when The People speak, and thus as the
moment when constitutional commitments can change. A speech
Gratz gave after securing the requisite number of petition
signatures to place the MCRI on the ballot-twenty-two months
before the November 2006 vote-demonstrates this focus
particularly well.136 She began by saying, "A year and a half
ago,.., we announced that an effort would be organized to amend
the state constitution to guarantee all people, regardless of skin
color, equal treatment under the law." 137 Of course, this implied
that the state's constitution as it then stood did not guarantee
equal treatment. 138 But the logic of her statement entails more; as
Gratz framed the issue, the proper way to produce the guarantee
of equal treatment the constitution then lacked was to amend its
text. 139
She continued:
"The [MCRI] proposes to make it
unconstitutional for the State to discriminate."' 40 Here, Gratz's
use of the word "proposes" implicates a starkly document-based
understanding of constitutions. Her statement assumes that
Michigan's constitutional commitment to nondiscrimination
hinged on the outcome of the election; Michigan might commit to
it, but only if the ballot initiative was enacted. For her, there was
no way to commit to nondiscrimination without a change to the
constitutional text.
Gratz then said, "In November 2006,
Michiganders will.., say no to discrimination based on race and
gender and Michiganders will say Yes to the [MCRI]."141 Here
Gratz's equation of constitutional change and textual amendment
is clearest. In a single moment Michiganders would vote, have
their sovereign voices heard, amend their constitution's text, and
"say no to discrimination."
The result of equating constitutional text with constitutional
meaning, as Gratz does, is a regime in which constitutional change
occurs in a start-and-stop fashion-in (iterated) fits and starts.
There are two ways to think of this consequence. The first is
related to elections and the second is related to constitutional
change. First, when initiatives are on the ballot, constitutional
meaning may change on Election Day; but when they are not,
136. See Gratz Remarks, supra note 131.
137. Id. at 1.
138 See id. (describing the MCRI's efforts as a "huge step forward"). But see
Mich. Const. art. I, § 2 ("No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws.
).
..
139. See Gratz Remarks, supra note 131, at 1-2.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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constitutions remain constant. Second, while voters may change
constitutions by voting on ballot initiatives, they do not change
constitutions at other times. In short, constitutional change
requires textual change, textual change requires citizen
participation, and citizens participate only during elections.
Consider an article in the National Review in which Gratz
elaborated on this perspective: "[H]owever fervently I may have
disagreed with a particular ballot initiative," she wrote, "I always
recognized that if the people petitioned their government and
presented enough valid signatures.., the people were then
entitled to a full debate and a vote."'142 Gratz here displays both
consequences of the logic of fits-and-starts constitutional change.
Her fervent disagreement with the policies of a proposed
constitutional change were constitutionally relevant not in and of
themselves, but only inasmuch as they would lead her to vote
against that proposal.
Simultaneously, while popular sovereignty entails that The
People are "entitled" to produce constitutional changes, they are to
do this through "a full debate and a vote[,]' 143 not through protest
and contestation, which are valuable only if used to convince
voters to vote for or against proposed changes. In other words, the
protest itself holds no value for constitutional meaning; it only
holds value in a war for votes. These ideas follow logically from a
theory which asserts that constitutional change results only from
election results.
B. Initiative Constitutionalismand The Political
Imagination
Gratz was not alone in equating constitutional law with the
Constitution-that is, equating constitutional meaning with
constitutional text. Michigan Governor Jennifer M. Granholm
joined in a suit seeking to remove the MCRI from the November
2006 ballot, 144 arguing that "[t]o allow this initiative to remain on
the ballot pollutes our voting system and undermines the freedom
of political choice .... ,145 Like Gratz, Granholm expressed ideas
142. Jennifer Gratz, "End Race Preferences:" The Fight Continues in Michigan,
NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE, Aug. 18, 2005, http://www.nationalreview.com
comment/gratz200508180819.asp (emphasis in original).
143. Id.
144. Kathleen Gray, Granholm Joins Civil Rights Ballot Suit: Critics Say Move
is Ploy to Get Votes, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Aug. 16, 2006, at 2B.
145. Brief for Jennifer Granholm as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Operation King's Dream v. Connerly, No. 06-12773, 2006 WL 2514115 (E.D. Mich.
Aug. 29, 2006), affid 501 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 2007).
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about the merits of the MCRI, but at the same time provided a
that initiative
of engagement
glimpse
of the form
constitutionalism demands. By linking "our voting system" and
"freedom of political choice," Granholm suggests that citizens
express their political choices through voting systems. 146 We
certainly do think that our votes send messages to those who
govern us, 147 so her suggestion is certainly true, as far as it
goes. 14
But her statement also suggests a constraint that
initiative constitutionalism invidiously works on our imagination
of how citizens express political and constitutional choices.
By thinking of constitutional text as the only site of
constitutional meaning, however, ballot initiative-based models of
constitutional change actually embrace and reify the judiciary as
the primary expositor of constitutional meaning. This may seem
counterintuitive, but it follows from initiative constitutionalism's
focus on constitutional text. In initiative constitutionalism, The
People make constitutional change during elections by voting on
ballot initiatives that change constitutional texts; during other
times The People are not involved in creating constitutional
meaning. As a result, it leaves to actors other than the sovereign
people-i.e., judges-the task of interpreting and understanding
the application of constitutional dictates to particular cases.
inheres
to
initiative
that
judicial
referent
The
constitutionalism is visible in the words used in the debate over
the MCRI and the media coverage of it. Two months before the
election, the Detroit Free Press-the highest-circulating newspaper
in Michigan149-began a report:
The Michigan Civil Rights Initiative, if approved by voters in
November, would spell the end for many programs and
practices used by government agencies, universities and public
schools that provide targeted help for women and minorities in
hiring, contracting and admissions.
But judges will decide which programsand practices end.10
This Detroit Free Press news desk was not alone in its conclusion.
One of the newspaper's columnists said, "[n]ot only will [the
MCRI] be challenged [in court], but it will be challenged multiple
146. Id.
147. Consider the headline that the New York Times ran over a news analysis of
the 2006 midterm election results. See Robin Toner, A Loud Message for Bush,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2006, at Al.
148. See infra note 224 and accompanying text.
149. See Refdesk.com, Top One Hundred U.S. Newspapers (Mar. 31, 2006),
http://www.refdesk.com/topl00pap.html (listing the top 100 circulating newspapers
in the U.S., with the Detroit Free Press the only Michigan paper to make the list).
150. Bell, supra note 128, at 9A (emphasis added).
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times, so millions of dollars that could have gone to other things
will have to be spent defending this initiative."'1 5 1 Another
reporter noted, "A similar proposal [to the MCRI] passed in
California in 1996. Courts had to sort out how the proposal related
to several programs, and the same is likely to happen in Michigan
152
if the measure passes."
Although Republican U.S. Senate candidate Michael
Bouchard disdained judicial imposition of constitutional meaning,
his understanding of constitutional law as judge-made is precisely
what led him to support the initiative and to stress the nature of
the MCRI's text: "We are voting for a specific amendment to our
state constitution," he said, continuing:
It is important that we get it right, so we don't leave it up to
judges to fill in the blanks if any questions arise once it is
woven into the fabric of our state's constitution. Therefore I
feel we must be vigilant from the outset that the language we
choose to address a problem does not open the door to the
53
creation of another problem. 1
Two opponents of the measure agreed with Bouchard's
assumptions, asserting "that the broad language of the ballot
proposal will likely lead to court challenges from both critics and
supporters of the measure."' 5 4 Nor was this assumption limited to
the news press.
Indeed, scholars sometimes conflate constitutional meaning
151. News & Notes (National Public Radio radio broadcast Nov. 17, 2006),
available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=6502104
(quoting Detroit Free Press columnist Rochelle Riley). These predicted challenges
came to pass. See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of
Mich., 539 F. Supp. 2d 924, 933-34 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (describing the politicalburden-based claim made by one set of plaintiffs, rejected by the court, that the
MCRI violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution
because it "imposes a 'substantial and unique burden on racial minorities' and
thus "it 'disadvantage(s) [a] particular group by making it more difficult to enact
legislation in its behalf" (citation omitted)); id. at 934 (describing the claim by a
second set of plaintiffs, also rejected by the court, that the MCRI violates the Equal
Protection Clause "because 'Proposal 2 has as its primary aim reducing the
admission of black, Latino, and Native American students and of women students
into some programs"' which it seeks to accomplish 'by eliminating the
'desegregation plans that have resulted in the admission of significant numbers' of
such students" (citation omitted)).
152. Tim Martin, Anti-Affirmative Action Ballot Proposal Stirs up Debate,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 3, 2006, available at http://www.westlaw.com (follow
"News" hyperlink; then follow "Wires" hyperlink; then search %allot proposal stirs
up debate") (emphasis added).
153. Associated Press, supra note 120 (emphasis added).
154. Robert Ankeny, Prop 2 Not Likely to Change Many Detroit Contracts,
Officials Say, CRAIN's DETROIT Bus., Oct. 9, 2006, at 24 (characterizing the views of
a business and legal/community leader); see also supranote 151.
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One commentator has
with judicial interpretations of text.
written:
The MCRI, now a part of the Michigan Constitution, provides
that, "The University of Michigan, Michigan State University,
Wayne State University, and any other public college or
university ... shall

not

discriminate

against

or

grant

preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis
of race .... Does "discrimination" or "preferential treatment"
on "the basis of race" include the use of proxies for race? The
depends on how courts in Michigan
answer to that question 155
interpretballot language.

Minimized agentive capacity for The People in governance
and constitutional decision-making is not the only unfortunate
consequence of initiative constitutionalism. More fundamentally,
initiative constitutionalism instructs individuals to limit their
political and constitutional imaginations and to merely accept the
15 6
binary, prepackaged choices presented on election-day ballots.
It does this because it flows from a theory of political change that
requires powerful individuals and faceless institutions and
bureaucracies to frame and present political and constitutional
choices. Under initiative constitutionalism, The People are told to
hold off on thinking about issues or making decisions until
Election Day.
The range of possibilities for dialogue between The People
and the law-including constitutional law-is, however, much
broader than what initiative constitutionalism might suggest. A
society's basic law is far more likely to reflect its populace if it is
the product of the populace's substantial engagement. Simply put,
popular constitutionalism demands and expects more of The
People than initiative constitutionalism.
As Robert Post has argued, one function of law is "to
instantiate community," by which he means the normative use of
law "to realize a form of social life in which we may share common
'commitments and identifications' that will enable us 'to determine
from case to case what is good, or valuable, or what ought to be
done."' 157 This is true even though "communities are [not] static
contestable, subject to
and unchanging. Social norms are typically
' 58
interpretation and reinterpretation."'
For popular constitutionalism, community is instantiated by
155. Fitzpatrick, After the Ban, supra note 123, at 292-93 (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
156. See infra note 194 and accompanying text.
157. See ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY,
MANAGEMENT 3-4 (1995).

158. Id. at 183.

Law and Inequality

[Vol. 27:53

the social, political, and legal debates that take place daily: these
debates are assumed to have constitutional valence. 159 It is the
"constitutional culture" produced by this constant engagement
more than any single or particular constitutional rule, which is at
the core of popular constitutionalism. 160
Under initiative constitutionalism, a society's laws are
merely a set of rules-dictates, the disobeyance of which results in
imprisonment, fines, or social ostracism but has no political or
legal valence. Under popular constitutionalism, by contrast, a
society's laws are remarkable primarily for the engaging,
genuinely reflective process through which they are produced. The
appeal of popular constitutionalism, therefore, is in the society it
promises, rather than merely in the particular rules under which
its members may choose to live. Issues remain live and up for
debate all the time. To live in a popular constitutionalist society,
citizens must have the energy and imagination to conceive and
reconceive, continually, the rules under which they live. 161
These systems leave judicial review in two very different
places. As we have seen, a theory that commits to judicial actors
primary responsibility for and authority over constitutional
change-even one in which The People themselves have the power
to modify their constitution at isolated and distinct moments-is
fundamentally not popular constitutionalism. Though as concepts,
judicial review and popular control over constitutional meaning
need not be mutually exclusive, neither are they fully
compatible.162 We must compromise between them. 163 Popular
159. See supra notes 27-80 and accompanying text; see also POST, supra note
157, at 183 (describing the competing functions of constitutional law in a
democratic society).
160. See POST, supra note 157, at 183; Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002
Term-Foreword:Fashioningthe Legal Constitution:Culture, Courts, and Law, 117
HARV. L. REV. 4 (2003); Post, Cultural Heterogeneity, supra note 15; Robert Post,
Democracy, PopularSovereignty, and JudicialReview, 86 CAL. L. REV. 429 (1998).
161. Cf. HULSEBOSCH, supra note 13, at 74 (describing constitutional debates in
colonial-era New York in the following way: "Constitutional discourse was the site
where all these social groups, from the elite to the popular, interacted to assert
their interests and make sense of their shared colonial world.").
162. See Post & Siegel, Policentric,supra note 12.
163. See supra note 49; see also supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing
the conflict between simple democracy and other fundamental values). The need
for compromise at a theoretical or systemic level is especially acute in light of the
fact that while the arguments themselves in favor of textual and non-textual
approaches to constitutional change may not change, the organizations which make
those arguments can switch sides when the prevailing political winds of judicial
(and nonjudicial) governmental institutions change. For example, the American
Civil Liberties Union, founded as an organization dedicated to extrajudicial
constitutionalism, soon recast itself in judicial-that is, litigative-terms when its
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constitutionalism and initiative constitutionalism balance judicial
review and popular expression in vastly different ways. In the
former, judicial review is generally subordinated to a multitude of
popular political expressions so that the constitution can live
among people; the latter leaves to The People a role in making
constitutional meaning far too circumscribed to be considered a
species of popular constitutionalism.
Pursuing this logic, Part III compares popular and initiative
constitutionalisms in terms of the agentive capacity each gives to
the people in making constitutional meaning.
Disaggregating "The People" from "The People"
Kramer and Siegel, of course, are not alone in writing about
In an article entitled Popular
popular constitutionalism. 16 4
16 5
Douglas Reed describes as "popular
Constitutionalism,
constitutionalism" all systems in which judges do not alone
produce constitutional meaning. 166 He argues that the ballot
initiative, when employed as a constitution-amending device,
produces "meanings of state constitutions-in both legal and
political senses-[that] are defined through both extra-judicial and
judicial mechanisms." 167 In such a system, he argues, "[tihe
interpreter of state constitutions[] ...is less likely to be a judge
and more likely to be a mobilized and politically active
168
citizenry."
III.

extrajudicial approach proved inefficacious. See generally Emily Zackin, Popular
Constitutionalism'sHard When You're Not Very Popular: Why the ACLU Thrned to
the Courts, 52 LAW & Soc. REV. 367, 382-83 (2008) (arguing that that ACLU
shifted to a litigative approach upon experiencing "extremely violent responses...
while trying to enact their vision of the Constitution through public meetings,
speeches, and strikes" and "the failure of its attempts to promote its vision of the
Constitution among members of the government").
164. See generally supra note 12 and accompanying text.
165. Reed, PopularConstitutionalism,supra note 12.
166. See id.
167. Id. at 875.
168. Id. Others agree that state constitutional meaning is produced in ways that
renders moot the worst claims of the countermajoritarian objection. See, e.g., Helen
Hershkoff, State Courts and the 'PassiveVirtues': Rethinking the Judicial Function,
114 HARv. L. REV. 1833, 1918 (2001) [hereinafter Hershkoff, Passive Virtues] ("The
countermajoritarian objection[] . . . lacks salience in the state court context, in
which many judges are elected, enjoy broad common law lawmaking powers, and
are subject to popular revision, reversal, and recall."); Helen Hershkoff, Positive
Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112
HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1169 (1999) ("[T]he countermajoritarian difficulty, and
attendant concerns about the democratic basis of judicial discretion, carry less force
in state systems."); see also Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Leaky Floors:State
Law Below Federal Constitutional Limits, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 227, 254 (2008) (noting
that state supreme courts "do not have the same obligations as members of a
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For purposes of this Article, what is interesting about Reed's
argument is its grounding in the ballot initiative.169 He explains:
"state-based constitutional amendments and ballot initiatives
demonstrate that leading political issues are finding expression or
resolution within the texts of state constitutions."' 170 It is through
these processes that state constitutions "exhibit[] a vitality and
responsiveness" to the citizenry's political concerns. 171 Reed is not
alone in linking the ballot initiative to direct democracy,172 and
from there to popular constitutionalism.
Indeed, citizen
lawmaking mechanisms like the initiative and the referendum
seem, at first glance, to be considered the paradigmatic tool of the
popular constitutionalist. Their proponents argue that "direct
democratic processes are at some level more democratic, more
legitimate, than representative institutions, because they are more
directly responsive to the people." 173 One commentator calls them
"a model for voter sovereignty." 174
The Supreme Court has endorsed this view, agreeing that
tools of direct democracy such as the initiative and the referendum
allow the deployment of popular sovereignty. 175 Observing that
"[u]nder our constitutional assumptions, all power derives from
the people," the Court has held that mechanisms like the initiative
must be understood as "means for direct political participation"
rather than incursions into legislative power. 176
In this context, the MCRI seems to fit nicely into the picture

unified judiciary. State high courts sit atop their own culture, with a different set
of legal texts and principles to harmonize, and a different social reality that exerts
some gravitational pull on the meaning of legal requirements.").
169. Hershkoff, by contrast, does not focus on the initiative or other mechanisms
of citizen law-making, but rather examines the political and institutional contexts
in which state courts operate. See Hershkoff, Passive Virtues, supra note 168.
170. Reed, Popular Constitutionalism,supra note 12, at 874.
171. Id.
172. See, e.g., BLAcK'S LAW DICTIONARY 799-800 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 8th ed.
2004) (defining direct democracy). An enormous scholarly literature also makes

this link. See generally THE BATTLE OVER CITIZEN LAWMAKING: AN IN-DEPTH
REVIEW OF THE GROWING TREND TO REGULATE THE PEOPLE'S TOOL OF SELFGOVERNMENT: THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM PROCESS (M. Dane Waters ed.,

2001) (linking the ballot initiative to direct democracy); JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN,
THE INITIATIVE: CITIZEN LAW-MAKING (1999) (linking the ballot initiative to direct
democracy).
173. See Sherman J. Clark, Commentary, A Populist Critique of Direct
Democracy, 112 HARV. L. REV. 434, 437 (1998) (characterizing, but not endorsing,
this view).
174. JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, THE REFERENDUM: THE PEOPLE DECIDE PUBLIC

POLICY 267-84 (2001).
175. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 672-73 (1976).
176. Id.
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of popular constitutionalism sketched in Part I. A small group of
citizens, unhappy with federal and state equal protection law
regarding affirmative action, placed a ballot initiative before
voters. After a year of debate, Michiganders voted, passed the
measure, and thereby amended their state constitution.
Ballot initiatives, however, are not without their problems.
Many scholars have documented the public choice problems that
inhere to procedures by which ballot initiatives amend state
constitutions. 177 Perhaps the most common of these critiques are
that initiatives promote undeliberative or uneducated decision179
contain
making; 178 are prone to control by wealthy individuals;
180
or bad
insubstantial
effect
and
language;
obfuscatory
unclear or
8 2
18
critiques.1
these
to
immune
not
is
MCRI
The
1
changes.
177. The literature on public choice and direct citizen lawmaking is extensive.
For a basic introduction, see generally FREDERICK J. BOEHMKE, THE INDIRECT
EFFECT OF DIRECT LEGISLATION: HOW INSTITUTIONS SHAPE INTEREST GROUP
SYSTEMS (2005) (applying a public choice-style critique to direct legislation); JOHN
G. MATSUSAKA, FOR THE MANY OR THE FEW: THE INITIATIVE, PUBLIC POLICY, AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2004) (providing an extensive overview of the initiative
process); Richard B. Collins & Dale Oesterle, Structuring the Ballot Initiative:
Procedures That Do and Don't Work, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 47 (1995) (exploring the
procedural differences among forms of state-wide ballot initiatives and reviewing
common critiques of these initiatives); Clark, supra note 173, at 439 nn.14-16
(collecting additional sources which make many public choice arguments); see also
Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking is not "Republican Government": The
Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REV. 19 (1993) (describing the
relationship between ballot initiatives and republican government).
178. See, e.g., JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, THE INITIATIVE: CITIZEN LAW-MAKING,
138-48 (1999) (listing the major arguments in opposition to ballot initiatives).
179. See DAVID S. BRODER, DEMOCRACY DERAILED: INITIATIVE CAMPAIGNS AND
THE POWER OF MONEY (2000).
180. See Taxpayers To Limit Camp. Spending v. Fair Pol. Pract. Comm'n, 799
P.2d 1220, 1236 (Cal. 1990) ("Often voters rely solely on the title and summary of
the proposed initiative and never examine the actual wording of the proposal."
(citation omitted)); Candace McCoy, Crime as a Boogeyman: Why Californians
Changed Their Constitution to Include a "Victims' Bill of Rights" (and What It
Really Did), in CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN THE STATES: CONTEMPORARY
CONTROVERSIES AND HISTORICAL PATTERNS 128-46 (G. Alan Tarr ed., 1996)
(discussing the passage of the "Victim's Bill of Rights" in California in 1992).
181. See Samuel Issacharoff & Daniel R. Ortiz, Governing Through
Intermediaries, 85 VA. L. REV. 1627, 1637 (1999) ("The initiative and referendum
operate in only some states, decide relatively few questions in them, and oftentimes
produce results of truly questionable value."); see generally Clark, supra note 173,
at 439 nn.14-16 (collecting sources making many of these arguments).
182. For example, Ward Connerly is a wealthy non-Michigander, and without
his $500,000 contribution and other help, the MCRI would not have been able to
get onto the ballot. See Lewin, Campaign Splits Michigan, supra note 116; Gratz
Remarks, supra note 131 ('Ward Connerly has been a great supporter, our mentor,
and our friend . ... "). Some groups alleged that Gratz's group engaged in fraud in
collecting signatures on a petition that would place the MCRI on the ballot. See
Operation King's Dream v. Connerly, No. 06-12773, 2006 WL 2514115 (E.D. Mich.
Aug. 29, 2006), affd 501 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 2007); cf. Dan Frosch, Colorado Petition
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Nonetheless, this Article bypasses these public choice
critiques and fastens instead upon a "populist critique" of citizen
lawmaking mechanisms to explain why ballot initiatives like the
MCRI are not-for whatever else they might be-tools that let
constitutions "livea among people"' 18 3 in the way popular
constitutionalism envisions.
In A Populist Critique of Direct
Democracy,184 Sherman Clark lays out a simple but profound
observation about the nature of initiatives: they ask voters to
decide one question of public policy at a time. 8 5 The consequence
is a far-reaching condemnation of "direct democracy" that is
untethered from public choice theory critiques that attach to
specific processes by which particular initiatives become law.
In Clark's account, by producing isolated moments of citizen
lawmaking, ballot initiatives are able to capture a polity's
preferences, but not its priorities. For Clark, the term "priority"
captures two ideas: 1) the intensity of a voter's preference for a
given outcome; 2) the relationship between A and B, where a voter
is less willing to accept outcome not-B than not-A, and may
therefore be willing to accept outcome not-A in order to gain
outcome B, even though she wants outcome A.1 86 These problems
result because each member of the polity gets a single vote with
which to approve or reject an initiative addressing a single issue,
but however she votes, she need not consider what she may want
in another public policy choice that the initiative presents as
87
unrelated.
There are two consequences to this fact. First, in a ballot
initiative regime, a citizen is unable to choose from among a set of
outcomes the one which reflects her preferred, yet not ideal, policy
positions. 188 Because "non-congruent majorities" will pass (or
Draws Charges of Deception, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2008, at A16 (describing alleged
fraud in Ward Connerly's organization to pass a ballot initiative similar to the
MCRI in Colorado). And there was substantial debate over the language that
would appear on the November 2006 ballot describing the MCRI. See Dawson Bell,
Both Sides on Rights Issue Call New Ballot Wording Fair--andCrucial, DETROIT
FREE PRESS, Jan. 7, 2006, at 6A; see also Jocelyn Friedrichs Benson, Election Fraud
and the Initiative Process: A Study of the 2006 Michigan Civil Rights Initiative, 34
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 889 (2007) (discussing the commission of election fraud by
proponents of the MCRI).
183. Hulsebosch, supranote 1, at 401.
184. Clark, supra note 173.
185. Id. at 467-73.
186. See id. at 450-56.
187. See id.
188. See id. at 482 (describing the result of ballot initiatives as demonstrating
"what the most people want, but ... not ... what the people want most"). But cf.
City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., 426 U.S. 688, 673 (1976) (equating ballot
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reject) different initiatives, a lawmaking regime should not
account for majoritarian preferences on a distinct issue as though
18 9
Instead, a
it were the only issue to be decided by the polity.
members'
polity
of
intensity
the
for
account
regime should also
by
preferences
allow[ing] each person, who knows that his or her perfect
world will not be enacted-who knows that he or she will win
some and lose some-to speak most clearly about the world as
a whole by telling us what he or she most wants to win and
what he or she is most willing to lose. 190
Second, a ballot initiative regime obscures voters'
prioritization among issues. 191 These mechanisms eliminate the
negotiations that go on between members of a polity in a regime of
dynamic lawmaking. 192 As Clark explains, "a referendum can
from trading
obscure the voice of the people by precluding them
93
outcome A in return for higher priority outcomes." 1
Another way to characterize Clark's argument is to say that
ballot initiatives fail to account for the nuances and contradictions
that inhere in modern political and policy goals. The ballot
initiative presents voters with a single, simple binary decision that
serves to obscure these nuances. 194 If the goal of democracy is to
95
then representative
measure the "voice of the people,"1
democracy is preferable to ballot initiatives because it accounts,
through phenomena like logrolling, for the practical complexities
of modern politics. 196
The principles animating Clark's critique are relevant to
understanding why an initiative constitutionalist regime cannot
simultaneously be a popular constitutionalist regime. As defined
in Part I, popular constitutionalism declares that The People must

initiatives to a "citizen['s] voice on questions of public policy" (quoting James v.
Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971))); Coal. For Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d
692, 699 (9th Cir. 1997) (discussing the interference of the judicial process with the
"will of the people" determined by referendums).
189. Clark, supra note 173, at 482.
190. Id. at 448-50.
191. See id. at 450-54.
192. See id. at 467.
193. Id. at 451.
194. See id. at 467. Erwin Chemerinsky also criticizes ballot initiatives as
presenting "binary" choices which strip complex policy choices of their "nuance" and
eliminate the possibility of "compromise positions that reflect the majority of the
voters." See Erwin Chemerinsky, ChallengingDirect Democracy, 2007 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 293, 299-300 (2007).
195. See Clark, supranote 173, at 437-50.
196. See id. at 456-78.
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negotiate the contradictions and nuances of their world. 97 On the
ground, when faced with specific policy choices, however, The
People must deal with the fact that different majorities want
different and mutually exclusive sets of outcomes. 198 Legislators'
repeat player status allows them to account for both voters'
preferences and priorities in passing ordinary legislation.199
Where the nuances of modern politics play out on the
constitutional stage, the repeat players-the makers of legal
meaning-are The People themselves. 200
Repeated and frequent citizen engagement is popular
constitutionalism's analogue to Clark's legislative solution. 201 Two
interrelated features of popular constitutionalism's constancy of
engagement justify this analogy.
First, in a popular
constitutionalist environment, decisions about constitutional
meaning are made dynamically by individuals constantly
observing the consequences of their actions. 20 2 Constitutional
meaning develops in the dialectic among social movements, 203 or
in the struggle for power between individual activists and
government actors. 204 This phenomenon is similar to Clark's
observation about multi-issue decision-making: because popular
constitutionalist activists push many different agendas, their
constitutional claims must adapt to each other. 205 Second, any
given person, even one who devotes all her time to political
activism, cannot engage in every social movement in which she
might wish to engage. This limit serves a role similar to intensity
or priority of preferences: like the legislator Clark imagines
representing her, the constitutional activist herself must make
choices among political commitments.
Like members of Clark's non-congruent majorities, each of
197. See supratext accompanying notes 17-26.
198. See infra notes 206-208 and accompanying text.
199. See Clark, supra note 173, at 456.
200. See supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
201. Though, as both Kramer and his critics envision it, popular
constitutionalism can be practiced through legislative action. See supra notes 48,
49 and accompanying text. Kramer also envisions that popular constitutionalism
can be practiced through unadulterated popular action. See supra notes 91-100
and accompanying text.
202. See supra Part I.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 63-68 (describing Siegel's version of
popular constitutionalism).
204. See supra notes 29-42 and accompanying text (describing Kramer's version
of popular constitutionalism).
205. See Clark, supra note 173, at 450 ("[W]hat is needed is a method of allowing
people to tell us, given that they will not get everything they want, which outcomes
they want most.").
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popular constitutionalism's engaged citizens must deal with the
fact that her "perfect world will not be enacted." 20 6 Just as
legislators make legislative choices, citizens make constitutional
choices all the time. Popular constitutionalist activist A must
confront activist B pushing a constitutional understanding
different from (and perhaps directly opposed to) her own, and
because there is no end to their struggle, A must compromise with
B in the hope that B will compromise with her. 20 7 Or as Siegel
describes it, social movements modify their20constitutional claims
in response to claims by countermovements. 8
Clark's point about voter priorities is also illustrative of
popular constitutionalism. 2 9 Individual activists' engagement in
social movements and other moments of popular political
expression demonstrate that citizens cannot engage in all actions,
at all the times, which their political commitments would
demand. 210 Any social movement, for example, is driven by those
who care so much about the movement's issue that they are
willing either to dedicate all of their money or free time, or to quit
their jobs and join full-time, the struggles in which that movement
211
is engaged.
The movement to pass the MCRI in Michigan demonstrates
this point as well as any other. Those engaged full-time in
advocacy over the MCRI chose this course because their
commitment to their position was extremely intense. When asked
when he would retire from backing initiatives like the MCRI,
Ward Connerly replied: "When my toes turn up, that's when I'll
One reporter described
stop fighting [affirmative action]. '"212

206. Id. at 448.
207. See id. at 466 ("No one will see all of his or her judgments enacted. So they
must prioritize, come to the table, and deal.").
208. See Siegel, Social Movement Conflict, supra note 12, at 1362-66 (arguing
that when a movement advances "transformative claims about constitutional
meaning that are sufficiently persuasive that they are candidates for official
ratification, movement advocacy often prompts the organization of a countermovement dedicated to defending the status quo . . . . This struggle to win the

public's confidence often has a moderating influence on the claims movements
advance.").
209. See Clark, supra note 173, at 450-54.
210. See id. at 456 n. 150.
211. See Akhil Reed Amar & Vik Amar, President Quayle?, 78 VA. L. REV. 913,
930-32 (1992) (observing and explaining the import of the fact that voters at the
extreme ends of the political spectrum, whose political preferences are most
intensely held, "may be more likely to contribute time and money [to political
campaigns] than the middle-of-the-roaders, some of whom may simply care less
about politics").
212. Lewin, CampaignSplits Michigan,supra note 116, at Al.
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Jennifer Gratz in these terms: "[H]er personal commitment to
ending what she considers discrimination appears resolute." 213
Or, consider one group working to defeat the MCRI, whose very
name communicates the intensity of its preference: By Any Means
2
Necessary. 14
Surely not all Michiganders fit this description, however.
One Michigan resident said: "I don't know a lot about Proposition
2, but I do know a neighbor kid, a good kid, a local kid with a 3.73.8 average, who didn't get into the [U]niversity [of Michigan] and
he should have.... I do think there's something wrong with their
admissions." 215 This resident had an opinion on the University's
undergraduate admissions policy, but did not exhibit the intensity
of some of her fellow citizens. Michiganders certainly voted on the
MCRI, but they were also concerned with the war in Iraq, health
care policy, the economy, and a multitude of other issues on which
Americans around the country cast their votes in November
2006.216
Michiganders who intensely held their preferences
regarding the MCRI founded or joined groups, and those whose
preferences were less intense simply voted.
I intentionally employ Gratz and Connerly to demonstrate
this intensity-of-preferences -accommodating feature of social
movements and other moments of popular political expression;
that they fit into both the popular constitutionalism and initiative
constitutionalism models indicates a patch of overlap between the
models, at least to the extent that movements to enact (or defeat) a
particular ballot initiative is a "social movement" in the sense that
popular constitutionalism employs that term. To be sure,
movements to amend constitutions by initiatives (or Article V
processes) and popular constiutionalism are not mutually
exclusive. 217 Indeed, the historical evidence on which Siegel relies
213. Bell, Iron Will, supra note 107, at 1A.
214. See generally By Any Means Necessary, http://www.bamn.com (last visited
Feb. 19, 2007) (providing information on a coalition whose goal is to defend
affirmative action).
215. Lewin, Campaign Splits Michigan, supra note 116, at Al (quoting Brighton,
Michigan resident, Vicki Smith).
216. See CNN.com, Exit Polls: Ballot Measures/Michigan Proposition 2/Exit Poll,
http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/20O6/pages/results/states/MI/O1/epolls.O/html
(last visited Sept. 28, 2008) (listing opinions of Michigan citizens voting on the
MCRI regarding the war in Iraq, health care, "values issues," the economy,
terrorism, and presidential approval).
217. Cf. Siegel, Social Movement Conflict, supra note 12, at 1327 ("Partisan
advocacy that changes the Constitution without amending it is often understood to
threaten the Constitution's democratic authority, yet the sex discrimination cases
are widely accepted as constitutional law, despite their roots in a failed Article V
amendment.").
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when making her argument about social movements and
constitutional change demonstrates the interrelationship between
to
changes
text-based
and
constitutionalism
popular
constitutions. 218 Consider the name that she chooses to reference
the set of precedents under which the United States Supreme
Court uses the Equal Protection Clause to prohibit gender
discrimination: "the de facto ERA."219 By so describing it, Siegel
invokes an (unratified) constitutional amendment around which
the feminist and antifeminist movements organized in order to
name the nontextual constitutional change that these movements
effected. 220 A coherent theory of constitutional change must
embrace moves to change the document's text; otherwise we would
be led to conclude that textual amendments are "irrelevant," the
221
very assertion against which Siegel wrote Text in Contest.
Popular constitutionalists do not claim that text has no
independent role to play in establishing and nurturing
constitutional norms and values. 222 Texts cannot be irrelevant to
popular constitutionalism; they are sites of contestation around
which social movements mobilize, and they thus dictate the lines
along which people engaging in popular activism articulate their
223
constitutional claims.
But to say that these two models are not mutually
exclusive-to concede that text does matter-should not obscure
the models' very real differences and, indeed, their fundamental
inconsistency. Initiative constitutionalism does not, and cannot,
account for the dynamism and constancy of engagement that
218. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
219. Siegel, Social Movement Conflict, supra note 12, at 1324.
220. See id. at 1366-69.
221. See Siegel, Text in Contest, supra note 63, at 297-98 (writing in response to
David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 1457 (2001), and arguing that "the Constitution's text plays a more significant
role in our constitutional tradition than Strauss contends").
222. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
223. In fact, popular constitutionalists do not claim that text has no independent
role to play in establishing and nurturing constitutional norms and texts. See, e.g.,
Siegel, Text in Contest, supra note 63, at 308-09 (explaining how sex-based
activists in the ERA era made claims to amend and to reinterpret the Consitution).
And conversely, even popular constitutionalism's critics concede, that
writtenness alone is of little import:
[O]urs is a written constitution, but nothing important hangs on that.
An unwritten constitution, constituted by a set of customary norms,
can also be interpreted or changed. The customary norms that make
up an unwritten constitution can be quite hard-edged and very
particular in content. Written constitutions, in contrast, may contain
very soft and general provisions.
Alexander & Solum, supranote 12, at 1603 n.20.
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defines popular constitutionalism because its model is too focused
on the constitutional text that its protagonists wish to change.
Proponents of citizen lawmaking focus on the elections in which
ballot initiatives are approved or rejected, and imagine popular
sovereignty as occurring at particular times and places. This
understanding of popular sovereignty inheres to all electioncentric understandings of popular political expression. Statements
by Gratz, who defended the placement of the MCRI on the ballot
as being an opportunity for "The People" to speak, also belie an
understanding of civic engagement-and of the expression of
popular sovereignty-that begins and ends with the ballot box.
They indicate that initiative constitutionalism's understanding of
constitutional change is far narrower than that of popular
constitutionalism's.
In other words, initiative constitutionalism fetishizes
constitutional texts, and by doing so, it encourages us to entomb
constitutions in glass cases. Because it is so sacred, constitutional
text can be changed only in extraordinary moments like
elections. 224 And once a constitution is changed, the (judicial)
query into constitutional meaning begins anew. By contrast, from
the vantage point of the popular constitutionalism project, popular
sovereignty-the engagement with and acknowledgement of social
movements and moments of activism in producing constitutional
meaning, interpretation, and enforcement-is not tied so closely to
constitutional text, and so this model does not fetishize
constitutional texts. Rather, it understands that constitutional
change may occur both on and off the books. 225
Textual changes are certainly fundamental modifications of
constitutional meaning, but so too are the nontextual changes that
The People can effect when a theory and practice of constitutional
change gives them room to act. People must make choices, but
they do so all the time, not only (or even especially) on Election
Day. They choose the organizations to which they will send
annual contributions, and which ones they will join; they choose
which op-eds or letters-to-the-editor they will write; they choose
the candidates for whom to vote, or, perhaps, for whom to

224. Certainly, elections are far less extraordinary than are the "constitutional
moments" that Bruce Ackerman describes, in which constitutional meaning is
fundamentally changed by the mobilization of a tangible popular sovereignty. See
ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 12, at 266-94. But the changes that ballot
initiatives visit on constitutions are also narrower in scope than Ackerman's
constitutional moments: they apply only to a single state and thus cannot violate
the United States Constitution's strictures.
225. See supra notes 217, 223 and accompanying text.
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volunteer; and they choose whether to express outrage at
particular prosecutions, or at particular police actions. Popular
constitutionalism gives The People room to act in these kinds of
major and minor ways. Popular constitutionalism recognizes
constitutional value in these daily actions and interactions, and
thus blurs the distinction between politics and constitutional
law. 226 This is how the movement locates constitutional change on
the ground 227 and lets the Constitution live among people.
Initiative constitutionalism cannot make this recognition, which is
why initiative constitutionalism is not, and cannot be, popular
constitutionalism.
Conclusion: Recovering Categories
Claims on constitutional meaning characterize much of
modern American political discourse. In part this is true because
the Constitution explicitly invokes popular sovereignty in its
preamble and invites these claims, and The People take the
Constitution up on this invitation. But it is also true because
Americans fetishize constitutions, holding their texts sacred and
not allowing ordinary politics to change their meanings. Because
of the former, social movements coalesce around constitutional
politics and citizen-activists constantly make claims on
constitutional meaning. But because of the latter, Americans
focus on events like ballot initiatives and elections as rare
moments of proper constitutional change, and thus as
228
paradigmatic moments during which The People speak.
The task of this Article has been to disaggregate these two
reasons for the proliferation of constitutional language in political
discourse. It has done so by suggesting a way to define the
popular constitutionalist project in relation to constitutional
claims; that is, not in broad generalities but rather with respect to
the daily social and political practices in which the project
imagines citizens engaging. Unlike initiative constitutionalism,
popular constitutionalism engages the Constitution as it is lived

226. See supranotes 94-99 and accompanying text.
227. Cf. George Fisher, Historian in the Cellar, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2006) (rerevisiting LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN & ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, THE ROOTS OF
JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ALAMEDA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA 1870-1910

(1981), and urging, in the context of legal history, the locating of legal meaning in
the lived experiences of citizens subject to laws, not only in the official
pronouncements about those laws).
228. Cf. Clark, supra note 173, at 434-35 (critiquing Governor Pete Wilson's
response to the passage of Proposition 209 in California, which was to say, "The
People of California have spoken."(citation omitted)).
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and experienced "among people" and "in action," not as it has been
"entombed in a glass case." 229
This distinction may be important for a number of reasons;
paramount among them is that to understand our actions as
citizens, we must properly contextualize those actions in particular
theories of democracy and popular sovereignty. By conflating
multiple forms of nonjudicial constitutional change within the
single category "popular constitutionalism," we strip that category
of its meaning and let the act of categorizing do the work we
should instead reserve for a debate on an initiative's merits. In
this instance, removing ballot initiatives like the MCRI from the
"popular constitutionalism" basket allows us to understand and
critique them from a clearer vantage point, divorced from the basic
rubrics by which we might judge popular constitutionalism's
products. So situated, we might criticize the MCRI on the merits
of its effects, or the motivations of its advocates, or the specific
procedures by which it was proposed and passed. The object now
is to study it on its own terms without letting the glow of popular
constitutionalism, now a fashionable academic project, become an
obscuring glare.

229. Supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.

